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REMEDIES PROVIDED BY THE
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INTRODUCTION
Twenty-four million individuals in the United States are reprted
to own stock in American industry.' Companies, exchanges and
stockbrokers, through the communications media, constantly encourage
the individual to own his share of American business. However, when
this same individual is injured by a violation of the federal securities
laws, he is often in a helpless position, either unaware of his injury or
unable to prosecute his claim.' The securities laws were established
for his benefit, yet it is financially impossible for him to take advantage
of their remedies. The burdens of prosecuting a suit-the expenses of
gathering sufficient facts, of lawyer's fees, and of complicated and pro-
tracted litigation-appear overwhelming when compared with the size
of his individual claim.
Indeed, the threshold problem is that the average investor has
neither the sophistication nor the time to discover possible violations
of the securities laws. For example, consider the length and difficult
contents of the average prospectus. Will the average investor read the
entire document? If he does, is it clear that he will understand the
contents? Will he be sufficiently well informed from other inde-
pendent sources to check the accuracy of the statements or to know
whether any significant facts have been omitted? Finally, will he
be able to relate the contents of the prospectus to other filings or to
later events?
One solution to this disturbing quandary might be to depend upon
action by the administrative body charged with the enforcement of the
1 N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1968, at 61, col. 6.
2 The wide diffusion of securities has created a situation where the single
and isolated security holder usually is helpless in protecting his own interests
or pleading his own cause. The plight of the individual investor is accentu-
ated . . . where his investment is so small that it becomes either impossible
or improvident for him to expend the funds necessary to prosecute his claims
or defend his position.
SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIEs, PERsoNN.
AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION CoMMrrTEEs pt IL at 1 (1937).
See Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir. 1965) ; Weeks v.
Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 90 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Trust Indenture Act § 302(a) (1),
15 U.S.C. § 77bbb(a) (1) (1964) ; Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Fuwtion
of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684 (1941).
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securities acts.' However, the Securities Exchange Commission has
neither the funds nor the personnel to investigate all complaints from
individual investors.
Moreover, Congress, in passing the two major acts in the field,4
determined that a private remedy was essential if enforcement was not
to be a haphazard affair.' The addition, through judicial interpretation,
of private remedies under other sections of these statutes has become
an integral part of securities law enforcement.' Since these remedies
are available, obstacles to their realization by small investors should
be minimized. The damages which such investors have suffered may,
in the aggregate, total more than the damages inflicted on the rare
individual who can afford the costs of a suit. The fact that the potential
defendant has spread an injury over a large group of people should
not make him any less amenable to a lawsuit. The individual who
trades on "inside information" or omits material information from a
prospectus, thereby injuring thousands of shareholders, should answer
in a court of law.
In principle, the law has been able to handle a representative suit
for over two hundred fifty years.7  The class action traditionally has
been available as a means for the individual to prosecute a small claim.
It also has been a device whereby one investor could benefit from the
vigilance and knowledge of other stockholders; 8 it would appear,
therefore, to be the ideal device for enforcement of the federal securities
laws. However, as the number of situations in which the class action
was appropriate and the number of people involved in mass injuries
increased, the law failed to meet the challenge of changed conditions
3 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(by implication). But see Kalven & Rosenfield, mspra note 2, at 687.
4 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-bbbb (1964); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1964).
6 There are three specific liability provisions in the Securities Act of 1933. Sec-
tion 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964), establishes the liability of the issuer of registered
securities if the registration statement is materially misleading or defective. Section
12(1), 15 U.S.C. §77i(1) (1964), gives the purchaser the right to damages or
rescission if he is offered or sold a security in violation of the registration require-
ments of the Act. Finally, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964), establishes the
same remedies as § 12(1), if a person offers or sells a security through a material
misstatement. It is instructive that Professor Loss attributes in part the limited
number of suits under these provisions (evidence of only 77 such suits could be found
through 1961) to the high costs involved, and that he views the class action as a
means of overcoming the reluctance of investors to sue. 3 L. Loss, SEcURMnEs
REGuLATIoN 1682-92 (2d ed. 1961).
There are likewise three explicit liability provisions in the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, but two of these, § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1964), and § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r
(1964), have been used less than the Securities Act provisions, see 3 L. Loss, supra at
1748, 1753, and the third, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7 8p (1964), the insider trading provision,
is not amenable to the class suit See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
6 The most important of these comes under Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§10(b), 15 U.S.C. §78j (1964), and its corresponding rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1964).
7 See Z. CHrAFEE, SOME PROBLEM.S OF EQrTy 200-01 (1950); 3A J. MooRE,
FEDERAL PRAcricE [ 23.02, at 3411-12 (2d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as MoORE].
8 Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 2, at 691.
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with an effective class action rule. In the old federal class action, all
those who were affected by a question of "common or general interest"
could sue or be defended by a representative of the whole.' This rule,
however, was limited at times to equitable actions " and situations
where compulsory joinder was appropriate. 1
A new class action rule was adopted in 1938 2 and, until recently,
has governed class actions under the securities laws.' 3 However, it
proved to be of limited utility in the situation described above.14  The
rule sought to define three different types of class actions, "true,"
"hybrid" and "spurious"-classifications based on "jural relations" or
the kinds of rights belonging to the members of the class.' From the
outset, this categorization could not be made by the courts on a con-
sistent basis.'6 In addition, the drafters failed to spell out the res
judicata effects of the different categories, because they agreed that,
as a matter of substantive law, this would be beyond their authority.' 7
However, due to the courts' reliance on Professor Moore's com-
mentary,'" it generally was held that absentee class members could be
bound by the result in a "true" or "hybrid," but not in a "spurious,"
class action. Thus, the category into which a judge placed a given
9 Equity R. 38, 226 U.S. 659 (1912).
' See McNary v. Guaranty Trust Co., 6 F. Supp. 616 (N.D. Ohio 1934). But
see Penny v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 138 F. 769 (8th Cir. 1905).
1 See Blume, The "Common Questions" Principle in the Code Provision for
Representative Suits, 30 MicH. L. Rxv. 878 (1932).
1
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 28 U.S.C. App. (1964).
13 See, e.g., Escott v. Barchris Constr. Co., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965) ; Harris
v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1964) ; Oppenheimer v.
F. J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944).
14 From the start, this rule came under fire. See Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBL.nrS
OF EQUrrY 200 (1950) ; Kalven & Rosenfield, mspra note 2; Keeffe, Levy & Donovan,
Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327 (1948) ; Note, Federal Class Actions:
A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 COLUm. L. REv. 818 (1946) ; Developments in
the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HaRv. L. REv. 874, 929
(1958). But cf. Simeone, Procedural Problems of Class Suits, 60 MIcH. L. Ray.
905, 953 (1962); VanfDercreek, The "Is" and "Ought" of Class Actions Under Fed-
eral Rule 23, 48 IowA L. Rxv. 273, 282 (1963).
15 In order to understand the gloss placed on the rule by Professor Moore, its
chief proponent, his trilogy should be read. See Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 Gao. L.J. 551 (1937) ;
Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REv. 307 (1937); Moore & Cohn,
Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32 Ium. L. Rav. 555
(1938). For an incisive and humorous "epitaph" for Moore's "accursed" labels, see
Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 2, at 707 n.73.
16The history of Pennsylvania Co. v. Deckert illustrates the problems the cate-
gories caused the courts. The district court said the suit was a class action, but did
not label it, 27 F. Supp. 763, 769 (E.D. Pa. 1939) ; on appeal, the court of appeals
termed it a "spurious" class suit, 108 F.2d 51, 55 (3d Cir. 1939) ; the Supreme Court
reversed the case on other grounds, 311 U.S. 282 (1940) ; the district court termed it
a "hybrid" suit on remand, 39 F. Supp. 592, 595 (E.D. Pa. 1941) ; on a return visit to
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, it was determined that the label was un-
important. 123 F.2d 979, 983 (3d Cir. 1941). See Edgerton v. Armour & Co., 94
F. Supp. 549 (S.D. Cal. 1950) ; Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. at 98 (1966).
17See Federal Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964) ("Such rules shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right").
18 See note 15 supra.
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action assumed a greater importance than many felt was necessary,
especially in light of the difficulty of distinguishing the different kinds
of rights involved. 9
The type of action which has been discussed above, the mass injury
under the securities laws, was always classified as a "spurious" class
action 20 in which the rights of the members of the class were "several,
and there [was] a common question of law or fact affecting the
several rights and a common relief [was] sought." 21 Although
placement of this type of action in this category was rarely questioned,
the effects of such a categorization were often criticized." In effect,
this was not a class action-only the original plaintiff and those who
took the initiative and intervened prior to decree were bound by the
judgment." The "spurious" class action appeared to be merely a
useful tool for avoiding joinder requirements' and for eliminating
some of the requirements of diversity jurisdiction for intervention."
More important, none of the necessary benefits which would
facilitate the class action accrued to those who used this device." The
representative was not allowed to represent, in any meaningful sense,
the rights of the absentees, because there was no legal relationship
between the representative and the absentees in a situation where there
was just a common question of law and fact. Thus, claims could be
aggregated only if the claimants could be persuaded to intervene. In
light of the financial and other difficulties of contacting possible inter-
venors 2 and the risk of their being liable for a percentage of the costs,
' 9 See Note, Multiparty Litigation: Proposed Changes in the Federal Rules, 50
IowA L. REv. 1135, 1160 (1965).
202 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcrrcE AND PROCEDURE § 562.3, at
278 (1961). See note 13 supra.21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (3), 28 U.S.C. App. (1964).
2 See note 14 supra.23 See, e.g., All American Airways v. Elderd, 209 F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1954).24 See, e.g., Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 88 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Zachmann
v. Erwin, 186 F. Supp. 681, 689 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
25See Amen v. Black, 234 F.2d 12, 16 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 352 U.S. 888
(1956), vacated as moot, 355 U.S. 600 (1957); Shipley v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R.,
70 F. Supp. 870, 874 (W.D. Pa. 1947). Contra, Steele v. Guaranty Trust Co., 164
F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 843 (1948) ; H. HART & H. WECHSLER,
THaE FEDmL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEm 937 (1953).2 6 1n addition to the psychological and financial problems involved in representing
only those actually before the court, the claims of the members of the class could
not be aggregated to reach the necessary jurisdictional amount. See Alfonso v.
Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 308 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Sturgeon v.
Great Lakes Steel Corp., 143 F.2d 819 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944).
Although this question has not been answered under the new rule, it can reasonably
be expected that, since the action is binding on all the absentees, the courts will
follow the advice of the commentators and allow aggregation. See Simeone, Pro-
cedural Problenms of Class Suits, 60 MicH. L. Rxv. 905, 936-38 (1962). But see
Alvarez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1967).
27In a "true" class action the rights of the members of the class were joint;
in a "hybrid" class action the rights of the members were several, but were bound
together by specific property or fund. In the "spurious" class action, it was said that
the rights were several and the relationship between the members was the common
question of law or fact See 3A MOORE 23.08-.11, at 3434-72.
28This could have involved ethical problems for plaintiff's lawyer. See ABA
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs No. 27; note 82 infra.
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it was entirely unrealistic to assume that a sufficient number would
come forward. When individuals did choose to join the action,
they often were those who had a larger than average stake in the
litigation and probably would have been able to overcome the
financial impediments and bring suit themselves. The new Rule 23
was promulgated on July 1, 1966,30 as an answer to the need for a
procedural device which would solve a problem peculiar to "our com-
plex modern economic system where a single harmful act may result
in damages to a great number of people," "1 a need which the "spurious"
class action had inadequately fulfilled.
With the adoption of the new Rule 23, the old "spurious" class
action was eliminated, and much of the confused precedent which had
attempted to cope with it became only a matter of historical interest.32
The new rule came to grips with the problem which the drafters of
the old rule had felt was beyond their authority: the binding effect of
a class action. The new rule supplied an answer: once it has been
determined that a class action may be maintained, all absentees will be
bound by the result, whether favorable or not.3 On first reading,
then, one would expect that the problems outlined above ' would be
eliminated; that a single plaintiff, with a small monetary injury, now
could represent an entire class. Because all would be bound by the
result, the plaintiff and his attorney could afford to prosecute the case
with vigor in the face of complex litigation and mounting expense,
since, if successful, the compensation would be a percentage of the
entire class' recovery.s
However, this may not actually be the case. There are very few
decisions under the new rule, but the results in some of these early
cases are disturbing.3 One explanation for the undesirable results is
that the Advisory Committee's attempt to fulfill the requirements of
due process, as the Committee understood them, resulted in extremely
stringent procedural requirements. These requirements represent a
built-in limitation to any future use of the class action. The other
explanation is that the courts are simply misinterpreting the require-
ments of the rule, and that it is this misinterpretation which is de-
priving the rule of its potential value.
29 See, e.g., Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48 (D. Mass.
1963) (four mutual funds were parties).30 FED. R. Civ. P. 23. The initial publication was in 39 F.R.D. at 95 (1966).
31 Escott v. Barchris Const. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir. 1965).
32 See BARRoN & HoLTzoFF, supra note 20, § 562.3 (Supp. 1966). See notes
15-16 supra.33 See FE. R. Cry. P. 23(c) (3).34 See text accompanying notes 14-27 supra.
85 See text accompanying note 84 infra.
:
3
6See Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd and remanded, CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 11 92,164 (2d Cir. March 8, 1968). But see Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) ; Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ; cf. Kronenberg
v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Brennan v. Mid-
western United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
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This Comment is an attempt to explore this problem of inter-
pretation as it relates to several important sections of the rule. Its
thesis is that it is within the courts' discretion and ability to give
effect to the class action device, even in the most difficult cases, by
giving full effect and sufficient weight to the main themes of the rule:
(1) the responsibility and deference accorded the trial judge; and
(2) a practical approach to the problems which might confront a court.
THE NEW RULE
New Rule 23 establishes, in subdivision (a), four prerequisites
to the maintenance of class actions."' The first prerequisite is that
the number of the members of the class must make joinder of all im-
practicable." The second requirement is that there must be questions
of law or fact common to the class. 0 The third and fourth require-
ments are closely related, the former stating that the claims or defenses
of the representatives must be typical of the claims or defenses of the
rest of the class,4" the latter requiring a finding that the representatives
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.4 '
37 (a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses
of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.3 8 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a)(1). The old rule permitted a class action if the people
constituting the class were "so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them
before the court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 28 U.S.C. App. (1964). This language
is so similar to that in the new rule, see note 37 Mtpra, that the old precedent should
remain a reliable guide to the minimum size of a class suit. E.g., Thaxton v. Vaughan,
321 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1963) (seven insufficient) ; Phillips v. Sherman, 197 F. Supp.
866, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (twenty-nine insufficient) ; Citizens Banking Co. v. Monti-
cello State Bank, 143 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1944) (forty sufficient). It is doubtful that
many of the cases which arise under the federal securities laws would have classes
small enough to enter this marginal area.
3 9 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (2). Courts have tended, in recent years, to give a
more liberal interpretation to this provision in securities fraud cases. For example,
it would now seem that individual questions of reliance will not bar a class action.
See Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1964);
Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 488-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Kronenberg v. Hotel
Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); cf. Richland v. Cheatham,
272 F. Supp. 148, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377, 381 (S.D.N.Y.
1966). But see Berger v. Purolator Products, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(consent decision; of limited precedential value).4o FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (3). This provision replaces a requirement in the old
rule that the members of the class seek common relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (3),
28 U.S.C. App. (1964). This could have been a great restriction on class actions
in securities cases in which some members of the class desired damages and others
rescission. Compare Farmers Co-op Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 133 F.2d
101 (8th Cir. 1942), with Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir.
1944). However, with a developing practical approach, the requirement proved not
to be very burdensome. See Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d
909, 915 (9th Cir. 1964). Since the new language is even more liberal than the
recent decisions under the old rule, this requirement should not place a severe restric-
tion on the securities law class action.
41FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (4). For a full discussion of the potential problems
inherent in this prerequisite, see text accompanying notes 58-93 infra.
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Subdivision (b) of the new rule describes the types of class actions
which may be brought.42 The old concept of jural relations has dis-
appeared; in its place are descriptions of practical situations in which
it is appropriate to employ the class action device. Although the con-
trary has been contended,43 it seems clear that subdivision (b) (3)
describes the only type of class action which can be brought under
the federal securities acts." Under (b) (3), the court must find that
42 (b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to indi-
vidual members of the class which would establish incompatible stand-
ards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests
of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent
to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent
and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced
by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
See Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. at 102 (1966).
43 See Memorandum of Plaintiff in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for an
Order Determining that this Action Is Not Maintainable as a Class Action 21-26,
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). This argument was
rejected by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, CCH
FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,164, at 96,756 (2d Cir. March 8, 1968).
44Although the language of subdivisions (b) (1) and (b) (2), see note 42 supra,
could be interpreted to include a securities law violation of the type under discussion,
it is clear that the rule contemplates this type of action coming only within the ambit
of "common questions of law or fact."
Clause (A) of (b) (1) has been described as required
"when the courts are called upon to order or sanction the alteration of the
status quo in circumstances such that a large number of persons are in a
position to call on a single person to alter the status quo, or to complain
if it is altered and the possibility exists that [the] actor might be called
upon to act in inconsistent ways."
Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. at 100 (1966) (quoting D. LouisErm. &
G. HAzARD, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL 719 (1962)). The note
goes on to describe the following examples, among others: (1) actions by separate
individuals against a government body to prevent it from making a particular appro-
priation might create the risk of inconsistent determinations; (2) many actions re-
specting an alleged nuisance might create the same risk. See Booth v. General
Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
Clause (B) is reserved for those situations where other members of the class
would be concluded by a judgment in an individual action, not legally, but as a prac-
tical matter. For example, if one individual were to bring an action for reorganiza-
tion of a mutual benefit insurance company, the effects of a judgment could hardly be
confined to exclude members other than the one bringing the suit. Another applicable
situation would occur when there are numerous potential claimants against a limited
fund. insufficient to fulfill all the claims. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,
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common questions of law or fact predominate over questions affecting
individual members .4  There are some recent cases which suggest,
notwithstanding a series of misrepresentations by the defendant or the
need for each of the members of the class to prove individual reliance,
that a typical securities case presents common questions which do
predominate. 6
In addition, the judge must find that the class action is a superior
means of prosecuting the case." The only alternatives suggested-
consolidated actions, liberal intervention and the test case 4-are
inferior means of insuring vigorous prosecution on behalf of a large
group of individuals, each of whose damages are very small. All of
these require too much individual initiative and assume a high degree
of awareness on the part of the average absentee. Experience with the
"spurious" class action strongly suggests that the class action, under the
new rules, will be superior.49 In reaching a conclusion on the question
of the superiority of a class action, the rules advise the court to consider
four factors: (1) the interest of the individual members of the class
in prosecuting their own action; (2) the extent and nature of the
litigation which has already been commenced by or against members
of the class; (3) the desirability of concentrating the case in one
forum; (4) the difficulty of managing the class action.5"
As soon as practicable, the court is to determine whether the
class action may be maintained. However, this determination is not
255 U.S. 356 (1921); Dan v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir.
1961); Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875
(1952); Citizens Banking Co. v. Monticello State Bank, 143 F.2d 261 (8th Cir.
1944).
Subdivision (b) (2) "is intended to reach situations where a party has taken
action or refused to take action with respect to a class . . . ." It is understood by
the Advisory Committee that a (b) (2) action will be employed when injunctive or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate. "The subdivision does not extend to
cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to
money damages." Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. at 102 (1966) (emphasis
added). It is clear, notwithstanding the Committee's statement to the contrary, that
its "primary utility will be in civil rights cases." 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, supra
note 20, § 562, at 69 (Supp. 1967). See, e.g., Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir.
1963) ; Brunson v. Board of Trustees, 311 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1962). It is probably
correct that (b) (2) should only apply to cases in which the party opposing the class
has created it through his own actions, and not apply where the class has defined
itself by reacting to the actions of the party opposing the class. See Note, Proposed
Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. RE . 629, 648-49 (1965).
45This requirement is closely related to the prerequisite in FED. R. CIV. P.
23(a) (3). See note 42 supra. In deciding this question, the court will have to bal-
ance the "value of allowing individual adjudication on each claim and the value of
judicial economy, which will be served by allowing the class action." Note, Proposed
Ride 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REv. 629, 643 (1965).
46 See note 39 sipra.
47 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (3).
48See Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. at 103.
49 See text accompanying notes 16-28 mipra.
50 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3) (A)-(D).
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necessarily final, and may be amended before decision on the meritsY'
Subdivision (c) (2) contains the notice requirement, which applies
only to (b) (3) actions. 2 In addition, subdivision (c) (3) establishes
the rule that the judgment in any class action shall bind all absentee
members of the class." Finally, the court is instructed that, when
appropriate, the class action may be maintained as to less than all the
issues (with others remaining for individual adjudication) and that,
in the court's discretion, the class may be divided into subclasses.54
Subdivision (d) " is the final portion of the panoply of dis-
cretionary authority which the rule grants the trial judge. Subdivision
(h) (3) allows him to decide whether a "common question" class action
may be brought; (b) (1) grants authority to the court to decide
conditionally whether a class action may be maintained and to amend
this determination any time before judgment; (b) (4) permits a de-
cision that the action shall be brought only as to certain issues or to
divide the class into subclasses. Finally, subdivision (d), entitled
"Orders in Conduct of Actions," gives the judge the power to control
the course of litigation. The rule sets out examples of orders which
are within his discretion. He may decide how to arrange the proceed-
ings in order to simplify the presentation; he may send notice to
51FE. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (1) :
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may
be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
5 2 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (2) :
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member
that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a
specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all
members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not
request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
See text accompanying notes 95-162 infra.
5 3 FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(c) (3) :
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under sub-
division (b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall
include and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class.
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b) (3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or
describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c) (2) was
directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds
to be members of the class.
5 4 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (4):
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as
a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided
into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this
rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
55 FED. i_ Civ. P. 23(d) :
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which
this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining
the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repeti-
tion or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) re-
quiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the
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members of the class in order to (1) inform them of a development
in the action, (2) tell them of the proposed extent of the judgment,
(3) allow them to judge the adequacy of the representation, (4) present
either claims or defenses through intervention, or (5) come into the
action for any other reason; he may impose conditions on the named
plaintiffs or subsequent intervenors, for example to strengthen their
representation; he may strike the allegation that the action can be
maintained on behalf of absentees. Finally, subdivision (d) includes
a catch-all authority allowing the judge to deal with "similar pro-
cedural matters." 56
It is clear that this authority is the key to the philosophy behind
the new rule. The judge is no longer a passive observer, allowing the
initiative of the opposing attorneys to control the course of the litiga-
tion; he plays an active role. In a very real sense, he is the guardian
of the interests of the absentees. Only through his constant vigilance
and sense of fairness will the radically altered Rule 23 achieve its full
potential. He must not only make the initial decision on maintenance
of a class action and constantly ensure that the decision was correct
and that the absentees' interests are being preserved; he must also
approve any final settlement of a case which has been maintained as
a class action.57
In this context, this Comment will analyze the issues which face
the class action trial judge in these primary problem areas: (1) the
factors which he should consider when judging adequate representation
under (a) (3) and (4); (2) the meaning of the mandatory notice
requirement for (b) (3) actions; (3) the difficulties of defining a
large, amorphous class for the purposes of giving notice and fashioning
a judgment; and (4) a final ancillary problem-the point at which
an individual should be allowed to appeal from a determination that his
action may not be maintained as a class action.
fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court
may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of
the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to
signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to inter-
vene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action;
(3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors;
(4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allega-
tions as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed
accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may
be combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended
as may be desirable from time to time.
56 It is not clear whether the ejusdem generis rule of statutory construction
would prohibit the judge from actually suggesting issues or evidence which the rep-
resentative of the class might present. In light of the importance of judicial super-
vision, however, a rule of statutory construction should not preclude the implementa-
tion of a sound policy.
57 Fa. R. Civ. P. 23 (e):
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs.
[Vo1.116:889
THE NEW CLASS ACTION RULE
ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION
It is crucial for the individual plaintiff with limited damages to
prove that he can adequately represent the absent members of the
class." However, failure of the courts to abandon three past practices
in class action litigation would seem to limit the likelihood that such a
plaintiff would be found an adequate representative: first, reliance on
differences between the interests of the would-be representative and the
interests of members of the class which do not go to the issue being
litigated; second, undue emphasis on the relative percentage of the
representative's interest in the total suit; and third, insufficient faith in
the monetary interest of the representative's attorney as a guaranty of
adequate representation.
Subdivision (a) (4) of new Rule 23 states, under the general
heading "Prerequisites to a Class Action," that one or more members
of a class may sue or be sued only if "the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." " Because
this language is so similar to that of the old rule, which provided that
one or more representatives "as will fairly insure the adequate repre-
sentation of all" could sue or be sued,"° it might be argued that the old
case law should still be relevant. However, this is not true in all
respects. Under the old "spurious" class action, most courts felt that
it was unnecessary to analyze the adequacy of the representation.61
The "spurious" class action was viewed merely as a permissive joinder
device, not binding anyone except those parties actually before the
court. Therefore, considerations of due process did not require such
an examination. 2 However, those few courts which viewed this type
of class action as binding on absentees did in fact confront the issue.
0 3
Since, under new Rule 23, every class action will bind all those who
do not ask to be excluded, the courts will be compelled to decide whether
the plaintiff adequately represents the interests of these absentees. 4
There are many factors which enter into any decision on the
adequacy of representation. The most important is that, with respect
to the litigated issues, the interests of the representative must be
58 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
59 See note 37 supra.
60 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 28 U.S.C. App. (1964).
61See, e.g., York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 528 n.52 (2d Cir. 1944),
rev'd on other grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377, 383
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). But see Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941);
Pelalas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1940).
6 See 3A MoORE 123.07[1], at 3425. This lack of concern did not extend to the
situation where the original plaintiff was given control of the action over other
intervenors. Id.
03 See Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941); Pacific Fire Ins.
Co. v. Reiner, 45 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1942).
6
4 See 3A MOORE 123.07[1], at 3425.
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coextensive with the interests of other members of the class.' Care
must be taken in the determination of this question in order to avoid a
problem which arose in the recent case of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.6
Eisen sought to represent all odd-lot purchasers and sellers on the New
York Stock Exchange during the six years prior to the commencement
of his suit. He alleged that the two major odd-lot dealers on the New
York Stock Exchange had conspired and combined to monopolize
odd-lot trading and to charge excessive fees in violation of the
Sherman Act. The suit was an attempt to recover the amount of the
alleged excess fees paid by the members of the class during the six-
year period.87  The district court, in deciding that Eisen would not
adequately represent the interests of the absentees, accepted an argument
advanced by the defendants." The defendants pointed out that the class
of odd-lot traders included traders, dealers, arbitrageurs and speculators;
that the prices of the shares purchased varied from the lowest to the
highest priced stocks on the New York Stock Exchange; and that the
nature of the transactions-long or short, on margin or for cash,
limited or contingent, and for a fixed amount or as part of a long-term
investment plan--differed in many respects. 9 These were indeed
factors which distinguished Eisen from other members of the class.
However, they were distinctions irrelevant to the issue in the case-
whether the defendants charged excessive fees. As Eisen argued (and
as the Second Circuit agreed 7), all these investors, regardless of their
purposes or of the stock they had purchased, paid excessive commissions
when they traded in odd-lots.
Within any class of litigants, there are likely to be substantial
differences. The factors on which the courts must focus, to the ex-
clusion of all others, are those which go to the common questions of
6 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); text accompanying notes 115-22
infra.
6 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd and remanded, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,164 (2d Cir. Mar. 8, 1968). Although the majority opinion speaks to some of the
issues raised by Judge Tyler's original decision (see, e.g., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
§ 92,164, at 96,754-55, noting that the district court erred in relying on the "quantitative
elements" of the nominal plaintiff's interest as a basis for dismissal), even the problems
discussed are by no means mooted or solved by this single decision. The vigorous dis-
sent by Judge Lumbard reinforces this point CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 92,164, at
96,761-62.
67 Memorandum of Plaintiff in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for an Order
Determining that this Action Is Not Maintainable as a Class Action 10, Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
68 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.RD. at 150. But see Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1192-164, at 96,754 (2d Cir. Mar. 8, 1968) ("We
believe the court employed incorrect standards in reaching this result').
69 Memorandum in Support of Motion for an Order Determining that this Action
Is Not Maintainable as a Class Action 5-8, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D.
147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
7o Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, CCI- FED. SEC. L. Ru. 1 92,164, at 96,754 (2d
Cir. Mar. 8, 1968). Indeed, if these were relevant distinctions among members of the
class, the judge was empowered to divide the class into appropriate subclasses. FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(c) (4) (B).
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law or fact for which the named plaintiff seeks to represent the class.
7 1
Thus, one court was correct in stating that two jobbers of gasoline
inadequately represented a class of 900 in an antitrust action against
19 oil companies which were alleged to have entered into a price-ftxing
conspiracy, when the relationships between the various jobbers and the
oil companies were governed by different types of contracts with
varying terms."2 However, if in this same suit all had been bound
by a standard contract, a court would hardly have been justified in
dismissing the class action merely because of a difference in termination
dates. This would be a "distinction without a difference" and of no
relevance to the ability of one to represent many.73
Once a court has passed the threshold question of common in-
terests, it will normally examine the number of plaintiffs and the
percentage of their interest in the litigation. '4 This factor was par-
ticularly important to the district court in Eisen: "Eisen's inadequacy
as a representative of the asserted class is further underscored by the
obvious fact that his interest, as sole plaintiff, is miniscule compared
to the interests of the class as a whole." " Other courts have also
been disturbed by a numerical disparity. 6  Such a consideration,
however, is contrary to the philosophy of the class action, especially in
those cases in which there is a large class, all of whose members have
miniscule financial interests in the litigation. What was said twenty
years ago may still be true today under the new rule: "The halting
quality of the confidence of both the drafters of the Rule and the courts
in adequate representation as a safeguard is exposed by their logically
unnecessary concern for numbers." '
The first objection to this unnecessary concern is that reliance on
numerical representation defeats the basic aim of the class suit. The
most important purpose of a class action is to allow one individual with
a small claim to represent many others, most of whom may also have
71See Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Redmond v. Commerce Trust Co., 144 F2d 140 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 776 (1944) (action to preserve a trust fund, where the court was not misled by
the divergent interests of the beneficiaries in the distribution of the trust corpus).
72Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941).
73 On the other hand, a judge must be careful not to overlook a distinction which
is meaningful and relevant. For example, a class A preferred shareholder would
not be an appropriate class representative for all class A preferred shareholders if
the case involved a dispute with class B preferred shareholders and the potential
representative also owned class B preferred. See Carroll v. American Federation of
Musicians, 372 F.2d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 1967) ; 3A MooE 1123.07[2].
74 See 2 BAUo & HoLTzorr, stpra note 20, § 567; 3A Mooan 23.07[4].
75 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. at 150-51.
70See, e.g., Pennsylvania Co. v. Deckert, 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941); Pelelas v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 F.2d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 1940).
77 Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rile 23, 46 COLuTm.
L. REv. 818, 831 (1946). The Second Circuit agreed with this analysis: "[W]e
believe that reliance on quantitative elements to determine adequacy of representa-
tion . . .is unwarranted." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, CCH Fmn. SEC. L. REP.
7192,164, at 96,755 (2d Cir. Mar. 8, 1968).
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small claims."8 To argue either that the individual's representation
is inadequate because he stand alone, or that there obviously is no
class because no others have chosen to join him," is to be blind
to the normal apathy or ignorance of individuals in the face of what
is, to each, a relatively small injury. Few people are likely to know
either that they have been wronged or that the law has a procedure
which will offer them relief." Furthermore, in many of those cases
in which the client's stake in the litigation is large enough to fulfill any
meaningful "percentage requirement," the potential representative is
likely in a position where he need not tie his action to the claims of
the whole class in order to present a claim sufficiently large to warrant
vigorous prosecution."' While it is probably true that the percentage
threshold to proceed as a class representative is lower than the per-
centage threshold to be in a position to "go it alone," it remains true
that a "percentage requirement" will affect those who are most de-
pendent on the class action as a means to press their claims. The
rationale behind the class action is to encourage the "little guy" to
bring an action; if he is big enough, he doesn't need encouragement.
A second, and especially telling objection to this "numbers game,"
is that it puts the plaintiff or his attorney in a compromising position.
If the client represents a small fraction of the class, in terms of numbers
and financial interest, an attorney who would otherwise be glad to
prosecute the suit must insist that the potential class representative
solicit other individuals similarly situated so that the court will be
more willing to allow the suit to proceed as a class action. This act
may well be in conflict with the spirit of the canons of ethics.82  The
attorney, through his agent (the client who approached him) is
78 Of lesser, but by no means of little importance, are the goals of protecting
the defendant from successive harassment suits, and the judicial process from the
great expense and delay involved in providing a forum for such a series of cases.
7 0 In Eisen, Judge Tyler noted "there is no evidence that any other member has
the slightest interest in this litigation. . . " 41 F.R.D. at 152.
80 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP'. 1 92,164, at 96,755
(2d Cir. Mar. 8, 1968) ; Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ;
Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp 48 (D. Mass. 1963). Further-
more, failure to come forward is as consistent with satisfaction with the representation
as it is with disapproval of the action itself. Compare Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine
Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1964), with Berger v. Purolator Prods., Inc., 41
F. R. D. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (consent decision; of limited precedential value) mid
Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 43 F.R.D. 192 (N.D. Ill. 1967). See Dolgow v.
Anderson, supra; Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) ; Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BtF-
PAI.O L. REv. 433, 460 (1960).
81 See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("The realities
of the situation here and in the vast majority of class actions suggest that the amount
of possible recovery by the class rather than by the individual plaintiffs furnishes the
motivating force behind prosecution") ; Murphy v. North American Light & Power
Co., 33 F. Supp. 567, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) ("these causes looked at in their true light
are really voluntary speculations in fees by the attorneys for the complainants").
82 "It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars, advertise-
ments, through touters or by personal communications or interviews not warranted
by personal relations. . . ." ABA CANONS or PROFESSIONAL ETHIiCS No. 27.
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soliciting business. In practice, this individual may not know others
who have suffered from the same group wrong nor where to discover
them. However, the more involved the lawyer becomes, either in
helping the client find other class representatives or in soliciting their
participation himself, the greater chance he takes of violating the
canons of ethics. The alternative, of course, is for the attorney to tell
his potential client that although he has a good cause of action and
there are others in the same position, the small recovery in the indi-
vidual action would not warrant the great effort and expense required
to prosecute the case to its fullest. Ironically, the same amount of
effort and expense would bring all those who are similarly situated a
recovery for the group wrong.
Finally, there is no reason to suppose the attorney will prosecute
the case with any more vigor if the plaintiff's share in the eventual
recovery is one or twenty-five per cent, or if there are two or a hundred
active plaintiffs. If the suit is successful, the attorney will receive a
percentage of the gross recovery, not just a percentage of his client's (or
clients') recovery."m This fact makes it feasible for the attorney to bring
the class action in the first place. So long as his client's interest in the
proceedings is identical to that of the other members of the class, the
client is, in reality, the class itself, and the attorney's stake in the
litigation will rise or fall with the interests of the class."'
Furthermore, is it not the attorney who is actually in control of
the case? He controls the course of litigation, decides the basis of the
suit and interrogates witnesses. Therefore, if the court desires to
guarantee adequate representation it should look at the real repre-
sentative, not the nominal plaintiff, who is no more than a vehicle
through whom the attorney is able to perform his role as a private
guardian for assuring compliance with the securities laws.85 However,
the courts have been unwilling to place great reliance on this "real
representative."
This reluctance to look at the representative's attorney as one
measure of adequacy of representation may stem from more than a
reluctance to break with the old precedent of looking at the number
of plaintiffs and the percentage of their interest in the total litigation.
83 See 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, supra note 20, § 570.1. See also Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
84 In his conduct of the litigation, the class action attorney must be careful to
avoid violating ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 10 (acquiring interest in
litigation), No. 28 (stirring up litigation), or No. 42 (bearing the expenses of litiga-
tion). However, there is no reason why the lawyer should feel any more restricted
in his conduct than in the normal contingent fee litigation which is specifically author-
ized by Canon 13 if supervised by the court, a requirement fulfilled by Fm. R Civ. P.
23(e).
85 The importance of the attorney has been recognized: "Conceivably a single
plaintiff with competent counsel may afford better representation to the class than
a great number of parties and a multitude of counsel." 2 BA!FoI & oIzLTzoF, .s'wpra
note 20, § 567, at 306.
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If the courts are to evaluate attorneys from a vantage point other than
their financial stake in the litigation, what factors are they to use?
Should the lawyer's reputation be considered? The judge may never
have heard of him. One possible alternative is to examine his ex-
perience in the area. This approach, however, might well make it
impossible for capable young attorneys to enter the field. If this tack
is nevertheless taken, one consideration might be an evaluation of the
lawyer's success in this type of litigation. But how is this to be
judged? Do settlements count as positive factors? An in-depth
examination of the types and difficulty of cases the attorney has
handled may be required. The entire procedure conjures up visions
of placing the character and reputation of the attorney on trial.8" It
might be embarassing to the bar if a judge were to dismiss a case
because of the inadequacy of plaintiff's counsel." So long as the judge
discusses only the positive attributes of counsel, there is no problem.88
However, once courts start considering ability, the judge who feels
that the lawyer is not suitable may well look for any other reason which
he might find "safer" to articulate as an excuse for dismissing the suit.
The danger of having cases decided on the basis of such sub silentio
factors is manifest. There is no doubt that an inquiry into the quali-
fications of the attorney in order to determine adequate representation
would be time-consuming and injudicious.
It may be argued that, if the percentage of the representative's
interest is considered irrelevant and the judge is barred from con-
sidering the ability of the class representative's lawyer, no independent
meaning attaches to the requirement that "the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." 8 How-
ever, there is an objective factor which the court should evaluate and
which gives some independent meaning to the adequate representation
standard. This is the ability of the attorney to spend a sufficient
amount of time and money to discover all the necessary facts, to line
up expert witnesses and to handle the other demands imposed by the
proper conduct of complex litigation. There would be nothing im-
proper in a judge requesting information about this ability; the require-
ment of adequate representation would seem to require it. If the judge
86 Apparently, evidence of this type was offered by Eisen, who pointed out to
the court that part of his ability to represent the class adequately was based on his
lawyer's experience. The opinion, however, failed to address itself to this contention,
merely pointing out that it was one of the arguments raised. Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. at 150.
87Although judges do make similar evaluations when they are called upon to
designate a lead attorney in class actions and other multiparty cases, this type of
decision is distinguishable from that discussed in the text. In the latter situation,
a negative decision may mean that counsel is denied any participation in a case; in
the former, his role is merely circumscribed.
88 One court put this reluctance in the form of a presumption. "Until the con-
trary is demonstrated, courts will assume that members of the bar are skilled in
their profession." Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).89 FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a) (4).
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feels that the attorney has failed or, at any time during the trial, does
fail to demonstrate the proper economic qualifications, he could use
his discretionary authority over the notice requirement to encourage
intervention. The intervening parties could help finance the litigation
and their attorneys could help guide it. This procedure is authorized
by implication in the Advisory Committee's suggestion that the dis-
cretionary notice under (d) (2) might be especially appropriate in a
(b) (3) action to allow the absentees to object to the adequacy of
representation."
In addition, the fact that a court might find it difficult to evaluate
the qualifications of the attorney in terms other than financial commit-
ment does not leave the judge without other ways in which to guar-
antee adequate representation. The trial judge, as has already been
noted,° ' is given a much broader role to play under the new rules
than in the normal adversary proceeding. He, along with the
attorney for the class, is the guardian of the rights of the absentee. The
broad discretion accorded the judge in shaping orders under sub-
division (d) can be utilized effectively to ensure that the attorney
prosecutes the case fully and does not represent the absentees on a
pro forma basis. 2 The attorney's self-interest and financial resources,
coupled with a vigilant judge, should insure adequate representation 
93
to the members of the class.
NOTICE REQUIREMENT
In the securities regulation field, the notice requirement of Rule 23
presents the greatest impediment to the prosecution of class actions.
This notice is intended to give members "an opportunity to secure
exclusion from the class." "' Subdivision (c) (2) requires that some
notice must be given in all class actions maintained under subdivision
(b) (3). The crucial section commands that "the best notice practicable
under the circumstances" be given, and that individual notice be
90 39 F.RD. at 106-07.
91 See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
02 See text accompanying notes 55-56 sipra; Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472,
481-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("If the trial court assumes a more active role than it
normally does and works closely with the attorneys, these difficulties should not
prove to be insuperable"); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 727
(N.D. Cal. 1967); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673,
684 (N.D. Ind. 1966); Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA.
L. REv. 629, 651 (1965).
93 It might be argued that the inclusion of adequacy of representation as one of
the "Prerequisites to a Class Action!' in FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a) (4) means that this
requirement must be guaranteed from the beginning and cannot include evaluations
of the role the court might play in later stages of the litigation. This argument falls
down on two points: (1) to read "prerequisite" so narrowly would require a judge
to dismiss a class action immediately if there were the slightest risk that plaintiff's
counsel would prove inadequate; (2) the rule in section (d) (4) specifically author-
izes responses on the part of the court to guarantee continued adequacy of repre-
sentation.
1M Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.ThD. at 107.
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given "to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort." " The remaining portion of (c) (2) explains: (1) that such
notice shall inform the class member that he can exclude himself from
the binding effects of the litigation if he requests exclusion by a certain
date; " (2) that if he does not request exclusion, the judgment will
bind him whether favorable or not; and (3) that he may enter an
appearance through counsel if he so desires. Subdivision (c) (3)
announces the rule that a judgment in a (b) (3) action shall include
those to whom (c) (2) notice was directed, who did not request
exclusion and whom the judge found to be members of the class.
The Advisory Committee's Note to subdivision (c) (2) 17 is not
particularly helpful in defining the meaning of the requirement for
mandatory notice. After parroting the language of the subdivision, it
refers the reader to the note to subdivision (d) (2) " which is more
illuminating. Here the purpose of the mandatory notice is stated: to
give absentees the opportunity to secure exclusion from the class.
In discussing the discretionary notice under (d) (2), the Advisory
Committee noted an inverse relationship between the need for notice
and adequate representation. "In the degree that there is cohesiveness
or unity in the class and the representation is effective, the need for
notice to the class will tend toward a minimum." " Thus, the provision
for discretionary notice in addition to the mandatory subdivision
(c) (2) notice "is designed to fulfill requirements of due process to
which the class action procedure is of course subject." ' One further
comment from the Advisory Committee bears special mention: "Notice
to members of the class, whenever employed under amended Rule 23,
should be accommodated to the particular purpose but need not comply
with the formalities for service of process." '
Neither the rule nor the Note explicitly supplies the answers to
two important questions connected with the notice problem: (1) who
is to compose and send the notice; and (2) who is to bear the cost.
The former question is faced twice, and each time, the answer is
either ambiguous or would yield different results depending upon the
type of class action brought. Subdivision (c) (2) states, "In any
class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall
direct . . . the best notice . . ."; subdivision (d) (4) states that "the
court may make appropriate orders: . . . (2) . . . that notice be
given in such a manner . . . . " The difference in language may
95 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2).
96See text accompanying notes 148-51 infra.
97 39 F.RtD. at 104-05 (1966).
98 Id. at 106-07.
99 Id. at 106.
100 Id. at 107.
lol Id. (emphasis added).
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imply that in a "common question" class action, the notice should come
from the court." 2 This would be compatible with the role established
for the court as a guardian of the interests of the absentees.
10 3
However, the source of the notice is a much less important issue
than its content. Regardless of the source of the notice, it is clear
that the court should play an effective role in supervising its content.
This will eliminate the risk that the notice will be used by plaintiff's
counsel to accomplish champertous ends or to convey the impression
that plaintiff's claim is well-founded." 4 If it is known that the court
will oversee the contents, there is also less chance that plaintiff or his
attorney will be able to use the threat of publicity about an alleged
liability to force a potential defendant to settle prior to the commence-
ment of an action. 0 5 It is unlikely that the type of notice of which
a court might approve would be so damaging that potential defendants
would be forced to avoid it by an unwarranted settlement. Although
there is no answer to the second question-who pays-in the new
rule, it is generally acknowledged that the plaintiff must undertake to
bear the expense of notifying absentees.0 6 It is, of course, this expense
which makes the decision on the amount of notice required so crucial
to the practicability of maintaining a class action.
Although the rule, when read in conjunction with the Advisory
Committee's Note, does not supply the specific guidelines which might
be desirable in such a new area, there are clearly certain factors which
will aid courts in the development of precedent under (c) (2). Most
important is the discretion accorded the judge in determining "the
best notice practicable" and the amount of activity which will con-
stitute "reasonable effort" to identify all members of the class. A
decision was apparently made by the drafters that the judge presiding
over the trial is in the best position to determine, in light of the case
before him, exactly what content to give these words. In addition,
the judge is instructed that the notice need not comply with the
102 See 2 BARox & HOLTZOFF, supra note 20, § 562, at 72-73 (Supp. 1966).
'0 3 See School Dist. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D.
Pa. 1967).
104 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. at 152; Cherner v. Transitron
Electronic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1962); Hormel v. United States, 17
F.R.D. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
105 Once a suit is commenced, the possibility of a settlement by force is reduced,
since the judge, as well as controlling notice, must approve any dismissal or com-
promise. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
100 See Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Fischer v.
Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D.
at 151-52. But see Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 498-500 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(speculating that the court might require notice be supplied by the defendant corpo-
ration on the basis of: (1) its fiduciary duty to its present stockholders; (2) its
interest in having all bound by the decree; (3) its ability to bear the expense) ; cf.
School Dist. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1967)
(plaintiff's offer to supply notice rejected); Developments in the Law-Multparty
Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REv. 874, 938 (1958) (court has power
to assign burden of giving notice).
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rigorous procedure required for service of process.0 7 On the other
hand, it is equally clear that some minimal notice requirement is neces-
sary to satisfy due process, and that the judge can demand no less.
The entire tone of the provision and of the Advisory Committee's
gloss is one of accommodation between the desire to inform the members
of the class and the expense and effort involved in providing each
individual with personal notice.
In view of this background, it could be expected that decisions
determining what will be required in a given case under subdivision
(c) (2) will represent a carefully reasoned attempt to balance these
competing interests. However, in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, the
first court to confront this problem under the new rule seems to have
accepted an individual notice requirement as mandatory, despite the
presence of competing interests. Plaintiff, as noted above, was seeking
to represent all odd-lot traders on the New York Stock Exchange
during the past six years. Eisen estimated that he represented "hun-
dreds of thousands" and the defendant in an affidavit estimated that
there had been 3,750,000 odd-lot traders in the last six years.' Not-
withstanding the disparity in these estimates, the fact that the class
represented by Eisen was extremely large is readily established. It is
equally evident that requiring individual notice to each member of the
class would present such a burden, both in terms of expense and
investigation time, that the class action would never be brought, even
if the action were to satisfy all the other requirements of Rule 23.
However, Judge Tyler rejected plaintiff's contention that notice by
publication would be sufficient, whether through free publicity 109 or
paid advertisements. The opinion simply stated that the rule and the
requirements of due process required individual notice to all those who
could be identified. With complete disregard for the rule's requirement
of "best notice practicable" and the rule's admonition of "reasonable
effort," the court went on to hold that, in light of the "financial
limitations inherent in the circumstances here presented," the class
action could not be maintained."0 This holding has particularly dis-
turbing implications; "' if the financial ability of complying with the
107 "Notice . . . should be accommodated to the particular purpose but need not
comply with the formalities for service of process." Advisory Committee's Note,
39 F.R.D. at 107.
10841 F.R.D. at 151.
109 Eisen contended that the publicity the case had received in the press should
be considered as partial fulfillment of the notice requirement. Memorandum of Plain-
tiff in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for an Order Determining this Action is
Not Maintainable as a Class Action 32, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). See N.Y. Times, May 3, 1966, at 69, col. 6; Wall St. J., May 4,
1966, at 8, col. 2.
11041 F.R.D. at 152.
"'I Despite the discussion in this Comment addressed to the mistakes made by
the Eisen court in regard to the maintenance of a class action, there is another factor,
the presence of which, although not mentioned in the opinion, was sufficient to justify
dismissing the suit as to its representative character. Even if the plaintiff were suc-
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individual notice requirement is held to be a condition precedent to
the maintenance of a class action,112 the chances of bringing a class
action will diminish as the size of the class increases and the dollar
amount of any individual's damage decreases."'
However, it would seem that fulfilling the requirements of sub-
division (c) (2) might not be as difficult a task as was implied in the
Eisen opinion. The language of the rule, i.e., "best notice practicable"
and "reasonable effort," seems to suggest (if not demand) a less
rigorous interpretation. Because of the emphasis which Judge Tyler
placed on due process, it is most probable that he was either unwilling
to exercise, or unaware that he possessed, greater discretion. The
opinion states that "it is virtually certain that far better notice than
plaintiff apparently contemplates would be necessary here to comply
with amended Rule 23(c) (2) and, even more importantly, with due
process standards." 114 This implies that due process in this case
required a more rigorous standard of notice than that required by the
language of the rule. Such a result, in fact, may have been the under-
standing of the drafters. Instead of explicitly attempting to state the
requirements of due process, the rule may have been drawn broadly
in order to leave the courts free to decide this question, which certainly
is within their area of competence. An examination of due process
requirements as established by the Supreme Court is therefore necessary
in order to determine what the minimum notice requirement for a
class action should be.
cessful on the merits, the cost and complications of dividing a money judgment among
the many members of the class would have rendered an action for damages a futile
gesture. This means that the Eisen court would have been correct in deciding not
to allow the class action to proceed because this method would not be "superior to
other available methods" for the adjudication of the controversy. FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b) (3). Accord, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1192,164,
at 96,758 (2d Cir. March 8, 1968) ("If as a practical matter class members are not
likely ever to share in an eventual judgment, we would probably not permit the class
action to continue').
1
2 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,164, at 96,760
(2d Cir. Mar. 8, 1968) :
Nevertheless, if the court finds that a considerable number of members of
the class can be identified with reasonable effort, and financial considerations
prevent the plaintiff from furnishing individual notice to these members, there
may prove to be no alternative other than the dismissal of the class suit.
The dissent's characterization of the majority's handling of the notice issue seems
justified: "Indeed, the question of how to give any notice which would be sufficient
to meet constitutional requirements is so impossible of solution that my colleagues
choose to ignore it." Id. at 96,761 (Lumbard, C.J.).
113 See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 500.
In view of the inordinate expense that would be involved in locating and
mailing notice to tens of thousands of transitory shareholders, it would be
anomalous to say that this litigation may proceed as a class action and then
lay down a condition which could never be met.
114 41 F.R.D. at 151.
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Constitutional Requirements
The most important Supreme Court decision dealing with the due
process requirements for binding absentee members of a class is
Hansberry v. Lee," cited in the Advisory Committee Note."" In
Hansberry, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the breach of a restrictive
covenant. The defense was that the covenant had never become
operative since the requisite ninety-five per cent of the owners had
failed to sign it. Although it was proven as a matter of fact that only
fifty-four per cent had signed the covenant, the injunction was never-
theless granted and upheld by the Illinois courts ..7 on the basis of an
earlier suit 118 involving a similar request for injunction, in which the
parties had stipulated that ninety-five per cent had signed the covenant.
Because this earlier suit was a class action, the stipulation in the
earlier suit bound the present defendants as members of the class, even
though the specific finding of the earlier court was erroneous. The
only way this finding could be set aside, according to the Illinois court,
was by a direct attack on the first judgment."19
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment. Apparently, the
basis for this decision was the divergent interests of the defendants in
the present suit, who were resisting the covenant, and their "repre-
sentatives" in the earlier case. The court stated, "Such a selection of
representatives for purposes of litigation, whose substantial interests
are not necessarily or even probably the same as those whom they are
deemed to represent, does not afford that protection to absent parties
which due process requires." " Although the Court was addressing
itself to the process due the absentee, nowhere is there a mention of
notice in connection with the necessary protection of absentee interests.
Rather, the opinion turns on the identity of interests and the fairness of
the prosecution by the class representatives. The presence of both
factors is not only necessary but also sufficient to bind the absentees.
"15 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
11639 F.R.D. at 106-07:
Indeed, under subdivision (c) (2), notice must be ordered, and is not merely
discretionary, to give the members in a subdivision (b) (3) class action an
opportunity to secure exclusion from the class. This mandatory notice pur-
suant to subdivision (c) (2), together with any discretionary notice which
the court may find it advisable to give under subdivision (d) (2), is designed
to fulfill requirements of due process to which the class action procedure
is of course subject. See Hansberry v. Lee . . . Mullane v. Central Han-
over Bank & Trust Co. . . . cf. Dickenson v. Burnham . . . see also
All American Airways, Inc. v. Elderd . . . Gart v. Cole ....
117 Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E.2d 37 (1939).
118 Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill. App. 519 (1934).
19 Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. at 373, 24 N.E.2d at 39.
120 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940).
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In the course of the decision, the Court noted:
Nor do we find it necessary for the decision of this case to
say that, when the only circumstance defining the class is that
the determination of the rights of its members turns upon a
single issue of fact or law, a state could not constitutionally
adopt a procedure whereby some of the members of the class
could stand in judgment for all, provided that the procedure
were so devised and applied as to insure that those present
are of the same class as those absent and that the litigation
is so conducted as to insure the full and fair consideration
of the common issue. =1
Notwithstanding commentary to the contrary, 2 it would seem a safe
inference from the language above (couched in the form of an invitation
to adjudication) that the Court, consistent with due process, might
sanction a rule which did not include any notice requirement, as long
as it is guaranteed that the interests of the absentees were adequately
represented. In any event, it is difficult to understand why the Ad-
visory Committee viewed this case as establishing a due process require-
ment of notice to absentees in order to enable them to "opt out."
The Advisory Committee Note also cited Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.'2 for the proposition that due process
121d. at 43.
22For early attempts to explain the rationale of the case, see 26 CORNELL L.Q.
317 (1941); 39 Miclt. L. REv. 829 (1941); 89 U. PA. L. R-v. 525 (1941). One
possible explanation, both advanced and rejected in Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class
Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REv. 629, 637 (1965), is that there were two classes
involved, one which wished to enforce the covenant and another which did not. See
3A MoORE [ 23.11, at 3471. However, this fact would not require the Court to discuss
the issue of adequate representation, a concept which the Court discusses at length.
Also, if the Court had felt it was dealing with two distinct classes, there would have
been no need to discuss the res judicata effects of the first decision, since the Court
had earlier spoken to the issue that one class could not represent another. See Smith
v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 301-03 (1853).
There are other commentators who maintain, notwithstanding the discussion in
the text, that the lack of notice to the other members of the class was the ratio
decidendi of the case. E.g., Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33
Coraqnz L.Q. 327, 337-39 (1948). These commentators may have turned to a lack of
notice explanation because of their difficulty in accepting the notion that an absentee
could be represented by an individual with whom he had no jural ties. See Note,
Proposed Rule 23, supra at 639. The same Note advances another argument against
the lack of notice rationale. "[I]t seems that it would be unfair to bind the rather
large minority of property owners who did not agree with the covenant merely be-
cause they had received notice that the other owners were about to stipulate away
their rights." Id. at 638-39. However, this argument misconstrues the purpose of
the notice requirement. If these parties had received notice they would have been
able to present to the court the conflicts of interest which separated them from their
supposed representatives. They would not have lost their opportunity to present their
case at a time which was convenient to them; certainly, in light of the antagonistic
interests, the court would have fashioned a judgment which did not bind those who
had received notice and were opposed.
The discussion above, however, does not negate the most obvious reason why
notice could not be considered the ratio decidendi of the case--the court did not even
mention it in connection with class action absentees.
123 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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requires actual notice to the members of a (b) (3) class.' 4 However,
it is also questionable whether this case is good authority for that
proposition. Mullane dealt with a New York statute ' which per-
mitted banks to commingle the assets of various funds for which it
was trustee in a common investment trust. The statute required a
triennial accounting which had to be submitted for court approval.
Two attorneys, one to represent those interested in the principal of
the commingled funds and one to represent those interested in the
income, had to be present at the proceeding." 6 The effect of a decree
of approval was severe; "every right which . . . [those interested in
the fund] would have against the trust company . . . for improper
management of the common trust fund during the period covered by
the accounting" 17 was thereby terminated. The statute properly
recognized that those interested in the fund ought to be notified of
such an important proceeding and provided that, at a minimum, notice
of the hearing had to be published once a week for four consecutive
weeks in a newspaper designated by the court. The notice did not
have to carry the names of all those interested in the common fund;
the only information required was the name of the bank, the date
of the fund's inception and a list of all participating estates, trusts or
funds."2 It was the adequacy of just such minimal notice that was
attacked in Mullane.
Before considering the Court's decision in Mullane, it is essential
to distinguish between the interests of the representatives in a class
action (either the attorneys or the denominated plaintiffs) and the
interests of guardians ad litem in a Mullane situation. It is much too
easy to view the two situations as equivalent, an error which the
Advisory Committee may have committed. In the common trust
fund example, the guardian ad litem acts without the advice or
assistance of any client. He probably knows few or none of the indi-
viduals he represents. His fee is court-established and is generally
independent of the outcome. There is a tremendous temptation either
to over- or under-litigate." 9 He can increase his income by choosing
to litigate issues without regard for the probabilities of recovering a
12439 F.R.D. at 107.
125 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 100-c (McKinney 1950).
126 Id.
127 339 U.S. at 311.
128 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 100-c(9) (McKinney 1950).
129 "Also, their interests are presumably subject to diminution in the proceeding
by allowance of fees and expenses to one who, in their names but without their
knowledge, may conduct a fruitless or uncompensatory contest." 306 U.S. at 313. It
is possible that Mullane, itself, was the product of such attorney action, since Mullane
was the guardian ad litem for the income beneficiaries of the common trust fund and
it is difficult to understand for what other reason he would challenge his own ability
to represent these individuals in their absence.
THE NEW CLASS ACTION RULE
sufficient sum to make the contest economical; or his natural inclination
may be to treat the proceeding on a pro forma basis. Assuming a
minimum fee system, the representative's purpose may be to see how
little time and effort he can put in and still receive this compensation.
In addition, all of the guardian's out-of-pocket expenses are reimbursed;
there is always a pool out of which these may be paid. Thus, a
situation similar to Mullane is probably not unusual: three interested
parties at the proceeding, all of whom are interested in having the
accounting completed as quickly as possible; or, in the alternative, one
or two who want to extend the proceedings, but none whose self-
interest guarantees adequate representation of the absentee's interests.
The same is not true of an attorney in a class action. Barring the
possibility of a fraudulent settlement, his interests are identical with
those of his clients. If they win, he shares in their victory; if they
lose, he will be uncompensated for many hours of hard work and
substantial out-of-pocket expense. 8'
These shortcomings of the guardian ad litem procedure may
have influenced the Court in Mullane when it turned to the notice
requirement. In this context, the Court probably felt compelled to
interpret the due process notice requirement to ensure that some of the
beneficiaries were aware of the proceedings. The Court stated that,
as to actual beneficiaries whose names and addresses were known and
with whom the bank as trustee regularly communicated, there was no
reason why notice by mail should not be required.' It is from this
holding-in a case involving a possible conflict of interest, a small
number of beneficiaries (only 113 trusts were involved), a mailing list
already extant and a notice by publication buried in the back pages of
one newspaper (which had failed to prompt any of the beneficiaries to
make an appearance) -that the Advisory Committee apparently drew
the conclusion that due process required individual notice in a class
action to all those who could be identified with reasonable effort.
The Court's treatment of unknown and conjectural beneficiaries
is more relevant to the class action situation. The Court felt that the
statutory notice was sufficient: although not likely to reach such
beneficiaries, it was not likely to be any less efficient than other
alternatives.' 32 The same notice was also held sufficient for those with
conjectural or future interests and for those who did not come to the
attention of the trustee in the normal course of business." The Court
3 0 See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 494-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ; Murphy v.
North American Light & Power Co., 33 F. Supp. 567, 570-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1940);
Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69
tARv. L. REv. 658, 662-63 (1956); cf. Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 269 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
131 339 U.S. at 318.
132339 U.S. at 317.
1'3Id.
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recognized that their names could be discovered through investigation,
but it also recognized that such a procedure would require considerable
delay and expense. "In view of the character of the proceedings and
the nature of the interests involved," the Court held that more notice
would be unnecessary."3 4 This can only be a reference to the ability
of the other beneficiaries, those whose names the common trust fund
trustee already had in his possession, to represent the interests of those
for whom notice was a mere formality. The Court looked at the
possible effects of an opposite holding, and realized that the burdens
of notice would largely offset the advantages of the common trust
fund device. "These are practical matters in which we should be
reluctant to disturb the judgment of the state authorities." 135
The Court took the same practical approach when evaluating its
requirement that individual notice be sent to known beneficiaries.
"Where the names and post-office addresses of those affected by a
proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less
likely than the mails to appraise them of its pendency." 136 Even here,
the Court specifically excluded such a requirement for actual bene-
ficiaries whose identities could be discovered only through costly
investigation. The entire rationale of the opinion rests on notifying
some of the interested parties with a minimum of expense and effort;
due process was satisfied even though all of the known beneficiaries
would not receive notice through the mail.' 37 The individual interests
of the income beneficiaries, on the one hand, and the principal bene-
ficiaries, on the other, were identical to those of other beneficiaries
of the same' type. "Therefore notice reasonably certain to reach most
of those interested in objecting [to the accounting] is likely to safe-
guard the interests of all, since any objection sustained would inure
to the benefit of all." 18
Given this analysis of Mullane, the Advisory Committee was
clearly misguided in interpreting the decision as requiring individual
notice in a class action."' If anything, the discussion of unknown and
conjectural beneficiaries seems to support the opposite conclusion-
absentees can be bound without any notice if their interests are ade-
quately represented. The same can be said for the three lower court
'13 Id.
135 339 U.S. at 318.
136 Id. This language should not be taken to mean that if defendant were to
supply plaintiff with an extremely long address list, plaintiff would be compelled to
notify all regardless of the prohibitive expense. The quoted statement was made in
the context of numbers which were relatively small. Further, the concept of "prac-
ticable" must include some notions of expense. See text accompanying notes 137-
38 infra.
137 339 U.S. at 319.
138 Id.
139 In fact, the Court did not cite any case involving a class action in the entire
Muilane opinion.
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cases 14 which the Advisory Committee cited with a "d." 141 or "see
also" signal.
Further doubt is cast on the contention that due process requires
such notice by an earlier draft of Rule 23 which was published in
1964.14' Although this version of the rule would also have bound
absentees in a (b) (3) action, the rule required "that reasonable notice
be given to the class, including specific notice to each member known
to be engaged in a separate suit on the same subject matter with the
party opposed to the class." 143 The purpose of this notice was the
same as in the present rule: to allow absentees to request exclusion.
Thus, at least at one point in the development of the rule, many of
the drafters saw no need to require individual notice to every member
of the class.
Other Considerations
There are three other arguments against requiring actual indi-
vidual notice. First, such notice was not required in the old "true"
and "hybrid" class actions,144 which bound all absentees 145 and is not
required in actions brought under subdivisions (b) (1) or (b) (2) of
140 Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. at 107. In Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d
244 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959), the Second Circuit dismissed a
suit brought by plaintiffs who were members of a class which had lost an earlier suit
in state court. There were four grounds for the decision-there had been ample
notice of the earlier suit, there was no antagonism betveen the interests of the earlier
plaintiffs and the interests of the group before the court, the same counsel had
prosecuted the earlier suits and the same issue was being litigated. Whether fewer
than all of these grounds would have been sufficient for the disposition of the case is
not made clear. The court quoted approvingly from Hansberry that "the Constitution
requires at most only that 'for any * * reason the relationship between the parties
present and those who are absent is such as legally to entitle the former to stand
in judgment for the latter.' . . . 311 U.S. 32, 43 . . ." 263 F.2d at 248. The
court went on to add "Also of paramount relevance is the well-known suggestion
... that a judgment may be constitutionally based on notice alone." Id. at 249.
Nowhere in the opinion, however, is there any indication that an individual notice re-
quirement is the standard which is required.
In All American Airways, Inc. v. Elderd, 209 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1954), the only
reference to the notice problem is a citation to earlier dictum by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in Dickenson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973, 979 (2d Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952). In the latter case the court had "noted a query ad-
vanced by text writers to the possibilities of extending the scope of res judicata,
where adequate notice and specific opportunity to come in have been accorded the
persons represented . . . ." The Elderd court gave no further definition of "ade-
quate" but stated without explanation that "no such compulsive notice as the writers
visualize is possible as to the unascertained property owners." 209 F.2d at 249.
In Dickenson v. Burnham, supra, the third case cited by the Committee, the only
reference to notice is the dictum discussed above in relation to the Elderd case. 197
F.2d at 979.
141 'Which means, I assume, as it always has, something like 'this fits here, but
I can't tell how. Cf. HARVARD LAW PEvmiW AssocrAnoN, A UNioRm SYsTEm oF
CrrATioN §27:2:4 (10th ed. 1958)." Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The
Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 530 n.178 (1967).
142 34 F.R.D. 325, 384-95 (1964).
143 Id. at 386.
144 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1), (2), 28 U.S.C. App. (1964).
14 5 See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 2, at 697-98.
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new Rule 23.146 Against this, it may be argued that a (b) (3) class
action most closely resembles the old "spurious" class action, where
absentees could not be bound. Yet the primary rationale for refusing
to bind absentee members of a "spurious" class was that the nature
of their relationship, involving only a common question of law or
fact, was insufficient to guarantee adequacy of representation, which
adequacy was recognized under the common law only when all parties
were suing in the same formal writ. 47 Now that this common law
"writ-bound" thinking has been replaced by an "interest-balancing"
analysis, it would seem that the courts' ability to analyze the adequacy
of representation should be sufficient refutation of this objection.
The second argument turns on the compromise struck by new
Rule 23. Under the old rule, an individual generally had to intervene
prior to judgment in order to take advantage of the favorable decree.' 48
This view was sharply criticized by Kalven and Rosenfield.14' They
felt that, if the class representative were able to win a favorable decree,
the decree should be kept open to allow all to participate, even though
these same people would not have been bound if the suit had been
unsuccessful. Only if the absentees were allowed to participate in this
way, their argument proceeded, could the "social utility inherent in
the device .. .be realized-all would be afforded inexpensive, certain,
adequate relief." ' This position was, of course, attacked as not
being congruent with the doctrines of res judicata and mutuality and
as being fundamentally unfair-the absentees received all the benefits
of winning but none of the burdens of losing.
The new rule thus represents a compromise between these two
positions. It allows broadened participation,15" ' yet it retains the
traditional concepts of res judicata and mutuality by binding absentees
regardless of the result. Instead of saying that "you are in if you
come in" or "you are in if you win," the rule declares that "you are
in unless you ask out." Thus, the primary purpose of the notice
requirement is to assure the absentee an opportunity to "opt out."
It would be ironic if the price paid for broadened participation-
the notice requirement and the right to opt out-became so demanding
146 See note 52 supra. Contra, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 92,164, at 96,756 (2d Cir. Mar. 8, 1968). Further, there has never been a notice
requirement for the derivative action, except in the case of dismissal or compromise.
See Fs. R. Civ. P. 23.1; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b), 28 U.S.C. App. (1964).
1
4 7 See Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. Rxv. 629,
634-35 (1965).
148 See 3A MooRE 23.12, at 3476. But see Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v.
Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), petition for cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1963).
149 Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 2, at 701.
150 Id. at 711.
151 In Dolgow v. Anderson, Judge Weinstein stated: "it is necessary to remem-
ber that the recent amendments were specifically designed to broaden the usefulness
of the class action device." 43 F.R.D. 472, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See Cohn, The New
Federal Rides of Civil Procedure, 54 GEo. LJ. 1204, 1214 (1966) ; cf. Derdiarian v.
Futterman Corp., 223 F. Supp. 265, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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that it effectively barred the class action in which participation was to
be expanded. The end result of this approach would restrict as many
"socially useful" class actions as the old rule's requirement of actual
intervention.
Finally, if there is an individual notice requirement in all (b) (3)
actions, fulfilling this requirement becomes crucial to the maintenance
of the case. Thus, there will be many attempts to have (b) (3) actions
reclassified as (b) (1)'s or (b) (2)'s. In light of the difficulty courts
had in the past in classifying actions to fit the old categories,' 52 and
the broad language of the present categories, 53 it would seem that too
much significance might attach to a difficult categorization whose
rationale is in doubt. This would not be the result if it were known
that placing an action into the (b) (3) category would mean a notice
requirement which was determined with serious consideration of the
practical possibilities.
Statutory Requirements
Notwithstanding the strength of the argument that due process
requires no notice to the absentee members of a (b) (3) class, the
requirements of Rule 23 must still be fulfilled. However, the minimum
notice requirement is no longer defined by the requirements of due
process; ' it is defined by the most reasonable and practical inter-
pretation of the broad language of the rule.
One thing seems clear-the ability to give individual notice to all
absentees should not be a condition precedent to the maintenance of a
class action. If a suit may be maintained under all the other require-
ments of the rule, the court should weigh the practicalities of the case
before it and order notice accordingly. The desideratum should be to
obtain the best notice "practicable" within the bounds of the limitation
of "reasonable effort." For example, in an Eisen situation, where
none of the other members of the class are known to the plaintiff,
where discovering them would involve tremendous effort, and where
the expense involved would eliminate any chance of the case being
prosecuted, "the best notice practicable" is something short of personal
notice to all.
However, the alternative need not be notice by publication. It is
clear that "chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident
an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a news-
paper," '5 and that it is unfair to require all absentee members of the
1 52 See Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 98 (1966) ("In practice the
terms 'joint,' 'common,' etc., which were used as the basis of Rule 23 classification
proved obscure and uncertain") ; note 16 supra.
153See note 42 supra.
1
5 4 See text accompanying note 114 supra.
155Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 320 (1950).
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class to "examine all that is published to see if something may be
tucked away in it that affects his . . . interests." 6 There are many
effective procedures 15 falling between the individual notice by mail,
which the Eisen court wanted to require, and the small advertisement,
which should be reserved for those situations in which more adequate
notice is impossible. 5 '
In considering the possible alternatives a judge should analyze
several factors. Although not an exhaustive list, the following con-
siderations are worth mention. First, the possible expense of any
type of notice should be compared with the total amount of recovery
sought; second, the nature of the suit should be examined to discover
if it is likely that any members of the class have an especially large
stake in the litigation; third, and connected to the second consideration,
an examination ought to be conducted to see if this is the type of suit
in which a great number of people would be likely to opt out; fourth,
and closely related to the first three considerations, an evaluation
should be made of the likelihood that the cause of action will ever be
brought other than as a class action if dismissed now. 59
Depending on the results of these evaluations, the court can then
order notice tailored to fit the needs and realistic possibilities of the
peculiar fact situation before it. The possibilities include: (1) indi-
vidual notice to all members of the class; (2) individual notice only
to those included in a mailing list available to the defendant or others;
(3) individual notice to a random sample of the absentees; 110 (4) indi-
vidual notice to those whose potential stake in the litigation is above
a certain amount; (5) notice by publication. 6' A court order to give
notice by publication should regulate the contents of the advertisements,
the frequency of their placement and the newspapers and magazines in
which they should appear. In addition, the court may order notice
by publication in conjunction with (1) through (4), as the needs of
the situation might warrant.
This process can be demonstrated through the Eisen situation.
In this type of case, the class is numerous and the individual stakes are
small. It would be unlikely, therefore, that many members would
want to opt out. In addition, the possibilities of the case being brought
through any other means are slight. In light of the foregoing, it
would seem appropriate to order notice by publication, specifying
national media such as the Wall Street Journal... or New York Times.
'56 Id. at 315.
'57 Cf. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 500-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
15 8 See 339 U.S. at 317-18.
159 Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("if this case does
not proceed as a class action, it is unlikely that it would proceed at all").
160 See Note, Binding Effect of Class Actions, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1059, 1064
(1954).
',
0 See Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
162See Fox v. Glickman, 253 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Derdiarian v.
Futterman Corp., 223 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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The alternative to this interest-balancing process is strict construction
of the notice requirement and the dismissal of many worthy class
actions.' This would be a greater injustice to both the class members
and society than would be the denial of notice to some of the absentees.
PROBLEMS OF DEFINING THE CLASS
Under the new rule, if all class members are bound by the result,164
there may be a problem of defining the class. The issue will arise
twice: first, when the court is required to direct notice to the members
of the class pursuant to subdivision (c) (2) ; again when the court, in
meeting the requirement of subdivision (c) (3), must describe those
who are bound by the result of its judgment. In the normal class
action, this task should not prove too difficult. The plaintiff will
assert that he represents all stockholders in a certain corporation or
all those who bought stock on the representations made in a certain
prospectus. Although it may be difficult to compile a list of all
members of a class, the definition of the class required by (c) (3) makes
it simple to determine if a party is a member of the class.
Thus, in the recent case of Fischer v. Kletz,'65 the court answered
the defendants' contention that failure to define the exact number of
people in the case was fatal by stating that "[t]he class itself, however,
has been defined with some precision, i.e., all individuals who bought
Yale securities during the period when the allegedly false and mis-
leading financial statements were issued and circulated." 166
However, the definitional problem becomes much more complex
when the size of the class depends on a question of fact which cannot
be determined until trial. For example, in Richland v. Cheatham,
167
the plaintiffs sought to represent all those who bought Georgia-Pacific
stock at a price allegedly inflated by churning and by purchases of the
stock by both the company and its pension trust. Even if the price
of the stock had been manipulated, the difficulties of ascertaining who
bought at the manipulated price remained. Thus, the factual question
1 6 3 It may be argued that any liberalization of the requirements for bringing a
class action would result in a greater number of "strike suits." However, it would
seem that the rule itself plus the acts under which suits might be brought contain
sufficient safeguards. The secret and outrageous settlement is barred by Fan. R. Civ.
P. 23(e), which requires court approval and notice to other members of the class.
The preliminary showing of adequate representation and congruity of interests would
seem capable of thwarting many frivolous actions. In securities actions, the court
is also empowered to require the plaintiff to post bond to cover defendant's costs and
attorney fees. Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964) ; Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, H§ 9(e), 18(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1964).
164 There is another, though less desirable alternative-it is not necessary that
all members of the class be bound. Subdivision (c) (3) authorizes the court to
exclude from the binding effect of the judgment all those who were not or could not
be properly notified. Hence the class could be reduced when judgment is given.
16541 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
166Id. at 384. Accord, Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
IN 272 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
920 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
of how long these manipulative activities continued to affect the market
price of the stock would have to be determined in order to define the
class. If it could be proved that the market price continued to reflect
the Georgia-Pacific purchases for only two weeks, then the class could
be defined. However, it was just as likely that the price continued to
be affected for one month. Thus, the court was presented with a
complicated question which a short hearing prior to trial could
hardly resolve.
There are two solutions which make it possible for a court to
permit a class action to go forward while reserving a decision on
the question of who is in the class until all the facts are presented.
The court could decide all Rule 23 issues except the size of the class,
hold a short hearing and tentatively determine that question, reserving
the right to change its determination ... if new facts come to light
during the course of the trial. This could be accomplished under the
power granted the court in the second sentence of subdivision (c) (1) :
"An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be
altered or amended before the decision on the merits." The second
alternative is also specifically authorized by the rule. "As soon as
practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class
action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained." Under this provision, the judge could delay determina-
tion under Rule 23 until all evidence which would be relevant to the
actual composition of the class had been presented.
The former proposal is clearly preferable. There is no reason for
the judge to delay his determination of whether the action can be
maintained under Rule 23. All other questions except the exact limits
of the class can be determined prior to the commencement of the trial.
By delaying this determination and thus delaying such notice as the
court may prescribe,16 9 a large portion of the trial may be completed
before anyone except the named representative is aware an action is
proceeding on his behalf. This deprives the attorney of the advice
and aid of those other members of the class. It also might force the
lawyer, against his better judgment, to fashion his presentation of the
evidence so that issues affecting the determination of the class would
be presented first. It would be much better, particularly in light of
some courts' concern with the relative interest of the nominal repre-
sentative, to allow some members of the class to know that the action
16 Any judge should approach the decision to change a class action into an
individual action with great reluctance and circumspection. The attorney represent-
ing the class probably has relied on the earlier determination that the action could be
maintained as a class action, and, if reversal comes at a time when the proceedings
have progressed quite far, he may have expended more time than the individual claim
is worth.
169 For example, the court, under the former alternative, arbitrarily could define
the class as the smallest unit which the final determination could possibly yield. It
would then be appropriate if the court were to direct notice to at least this group.
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is proceeding, and then amend the description of the class some time
prior to the final judgment.
Another objection to delaying determination of whether the action
can be maintained as a class action is psychological. Armed with a
ruling that his is a class action, the attorney for the class will probably
proceed with vigor and enthusiasm; if denied such a determination he
may refuse to proceed, with consequent loss of benefit to both the small
individual plaintiffs the rule is designed to encourage and the general
public.
APPEALABILITY
There is a final area in which a practical and realistic approach
to the maintenance of class actions will help to insure effectiveness.
A plaintiff will frequently want to appeal a lower court determination
that his suit is not properly brought as a class action. However, prec-
edent under the old "spurious" class action rule indicates that the courts
would not hear the appeal immediately after the decision by the trial
court. For example, in Lipsett v. United States,"70 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to hear an appeal from an
order striking the allegation of class action. Denial of an appeal in
this situation was not altogether wrong. The fact that a plaintiff
could not maintain his action as a "spurious" class action really did
not affect anything. Since the "spurious" class action was merely a
permissive joinder device, all those who had intervened could still
maintain their cause of action. And Rule 24 still would allow those
who wished the right to intervene. The denial of the allegation that
the case could be maintained as a class action "merely prettified the
pleadings." 17' In All American Airways v. Elderd,"'2 the court, when
confronted with the same situation,"'3 said that the maintenance of the
class action "cannot make the case of the claimed representatives
stronger, or give them rights which they would not have of their own
strength, or affect legally the rights or obligations of those who do
not intervene."
Under the new rules, however, the issue is considerably different.
If the court in an Eisen situation chooses to render an order that an
action is not maintainable as a class action, the law suit will, for all
intents and purposes, end. It is unrealistic to assume that the plaintiff
will continue to prosecute his own small claim through a lengthy and
170359 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1966).
171 Id. at 958.
172 209 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1954).
173 The counterclaiming defendants appealed the determination that the action
could not be maintained as a class action. They had been hopeful that the court
of appeals would declare this an appropriate case in which to bind the absentees.
Id. at 248-49.
174Id. at 248.
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complex litigation, gambling all the while that the trial judge's original
determination will be reversed. For this reason, an immediate appeal
should be allowed from the class action decision. 5  There is ample
precedent for such action in closely analogous situations where it
would be unfair to ask that "appellate consideration be deferred until
the whole case is adjudicated." "7 Although the appeals statute states
that the "courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction from all final de-
cisions of the district courts . . .," 177 the requirement of finality is
to be given "a practical rather than a technical construction." 178 The
courts of appeals are to balance the undesirability of piecemeal review
against the dangers of denying justice through a delay until there is an
actual final judgment.
Thus, the government has been allowed to appeal an order of
the trial court striking a tax lien from the records and substituting a
supersedeas bond because, if the government won the case on the
merits, it would be delayed in collecting the disputed taxes.17 The
same result was reached in a case involving the vacating of the attach-
ment of a ship. The court held this determination appealable because
review of the order dissolving the attachment would be meaningless
once the vessel had been released and the possibilities of re-attachment
concomitantly dimmed. °80 Perhaps the best analogy to appeal of the
class action determination is the allowance of an appeal where the
plaintiff has been denied a motion to appeal in forma pauperis.181 If
such an appeal is not allowed, it is extremely unlikely that the indi-
vidual would ever have his case heard on the merits. The Eisen
situation is similar. If appeal is not allowed, there is little hope that a
175 Perhaps, also, the defendant in a case in which the plaintiff has been granted
permission to proceed as a class-representative ought to be forced to take an inter-
locutory appeal on this decision or waive his right to contest the issue at a later date.
This would be consistent with the rationale which attempts to encourage plaintiffs
to proceed with complex litigation with full vigor in reliance that, at least if they
should win on the merits, they would be rewarded with a large recovery on behalf
of the class. As matters stand, it may be to the defendant's advantage to wait, since
the greater financial burden may be falling on the plaintiff. The resultant financial
uncertainty might lead plaintiff to accept a less favorable settlement than might
otherwise result. On the other hand, the idea of forcing a party to appeal (as
opposed to allowing a party to do so) smacks of procedural unfairness. Placing the
opposing party in the same posture would not restore fairness to the situation. Fur-
ther, at best, the forced appeal would only include those issues which could be ad-
judicated prior to trial. There are, of course, many issues plus a specific authoriza-
tion for redetermination of the class action question, see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d) (4),
which only can occur during or after trial.
176 Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
177 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1964).
178 Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
179 Tomlinson v. Pollar, 220 F.2d 308 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832 (1955).
180 Swift & Co. v. Compania Carbide, 339 U.S. 684 (1950).
181 Roberts v. United States District Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950).
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lawyer will pursue plaintiff's claim for $70 in the expectation that the
class action determination wili be reversed on appeal, following ad-
judication on the merits."s
CONCLUSION
It can be seen that if the new class action rule is to achieve its full
potential as a device for prosecuting many socially worthwhile suits, a
new and consistent attitude by the judiciary is required. The courts
must understand that it is incumbent upon them to facilitate the bring-
ing of these suits by giving the rules a liberal interpretation. Moreover,
the courts must assume the additional role of guardian, a role which
is required by the liberalization or rejection of some of the outdated
"procedural safeguards." If this mandate is followed, the new Rule 23
will become a useful and viable tool.
182 This was the approach taken by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 319 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1035 (1967) : "Dismissal of the class action in the present case will irreparably
harm Eisen and all others similarly situated, for . . . it will for all practical pur-
poses terminate the litigation."
